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The Omnibus Hearing: Benefit
or Burden for State Courts?
By Joel J. Fryer*

The inefficiency of the criminal justice system has come to be recognized
by judicial reformers as a major problem that has been exacerbated by the
expansion of the rights of defendants. During the past 15 years, largely in
response to U.S. Supreme Court decisions attempting to insure due process
and promote fairness, trial courts have had to accommodate not only the
resultant changes in criminal practice and procedure but also the increased
caseload caused by defendants' assertion of constitutional rights which
have been recently articulated and guaranteed. The recognition that the
burden placed on courts must not be so great as to render them incapable
of implementing the substantive legal reforms has led to proposals for
various procedural reforms, which attempt not only to cure due-process
defects and promote fairness but also to aid trial courts in managing their
increased workload.
One such proposal is the omnibus hearing, the merits of which were
lauded at the 1976 Georgia Bench and Bar Conference by Judge Gerald
Tjoflat of the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.' Characterizing the
present system as "trial by ambush," Judge Tjoflat stressed the benefits
of voluntary reciprocal discovery as the primary objective of omnibus hearings and urged that the procedure be adopted by state and federal courts
because it "holds the key to the survival of the criminal justice system." 2
While "trial by ambush" cannot be defended nor its spirit reconciled
with the American ideal of fair and impartial criminal justice, the benefits
of discovery alone may not be enough to recommend the omnibus procedure to state courts. Judge Tjoflat felt other benefits were realized in the
Middle District of Florida, where he was a judge before his appointment
to the court of appeals. After a description of the omnibus hearing and a
brief overview of the major omnibus hearing projects about which reports
are available, this article will focus on whether such a reform would be
beneficial to state courts. Because of certain similarities with the experience of the Fulton County Superior Court, the experience of the San Diego
division of the U.S. District Court for the central division of California will
* Judge, Fulton County Superior Court, Atlanta Judicial Circuit, University of Georgia
(B.B.A, 1948; J.D., 1951). The article was written with the aid of his law clerk, Dudley C.
Rochelle.
1. "Trial by Ambush:" Is Omnibus Hearing the Answer?, 3 GA. COURTS J. 17 (June, 1976).
2. Id. at 18.
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be outlined in some detail.
First proposed by the American Bar Association in 1967, the omnibus
hearing is part of a three-step judicial process in which the trial court
shares with counsel the responsibility for raising issues and moving the
case to final disposition. 3 The first step consists of discussions between
counsel, without court supervision; the goals are full knowledge of the facts
of the case by both the prosecution and the defense, consideration of a
guilty plea, and identification of the issues that probably will arise. The
second stage, the omnibus hearing itself, provides direct court supervision
of those goals. In a formal hearing in open court, the court determines
whether discovery has been accomplished and takes appropriate action if
it has not, reviews the checklist-motions filed by the parties to ensure that
all issues have been raised, immediately disposes of those motions that do
not require hearings, and sets definite times for hearings on motions that
do require hearings. The third stage, the pretrial conference to discuss
specifics of the projected trial, is reached in only those few cases which
actually go to trial.4
Those urging the adoption of the omnibus hearing argue that its benefits
to the prosecution, the defense, and the court are numerous: "The reduction of issues in the field of discovery makes omnibus an invaluable tool
for complete and informal discovery by the prosecution and defense, thus
providing the latter with a more intelligent and enlightened plea. Other
benefits . . .include a more logical and cogent case presentation, reduc-

tion of postconviction procedures, minimization of speedy trial deprivation, and increased numbers of guilty pleas . .
3.

. . ,,These

benefits logi-

ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO

DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL (Approved Draft 1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA
STANDARDS].
4.

R. NIMMER, THE OMNIBUS HEARING: AN EXPERIMENT IN RELIEVING INEFFICIENCY, UNFAIR-

NESS, AND JUDICIAL DELAY 22-24 (1971) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER, EXPERIMENT]. This is

an American Bar Foundation study of the effects of omnibus hearings in the San Diego
Division of the Southern District of California. A later report combines these findings with a
study of the Western District of Texas. See R. NIMMER, THE OMNIBUS HEARING FINAL REPORT,
AMERICAN BAR FOJNDATION REPORT (Tent. draft 1973).

5. Myers, The Omnibus Proceeding: Clarificationof Discovery in the FederalCourts and
Other Benefits, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 386, 387 (1971) (citations omitted) [hereinafter cited as
Myers, Benefits]. The stated purposes of the omnibus project are to (1) eliminate the written
motion practice, except where necessary; (2) secure discovery by the prosecutor and the
defense within the constitutional limits permitted; (3) encourage voluntary disclosure by the
prosecution of its basic case; (4) rule upon and supervise additional discovery requested by
the parties; (5) expose and dispose of latent constitutional issues; (6) provide a period of time
prior to the omnibus hearing for disclosure, exploration and plea discussion between counsel;
(7) allow the defendant discovery so that he may make an informed decision; (8) use the
procedure, as far as possible, for those cases where either sufficient information has not been
secured for an informed plea, or the case probably will go to trial; (9) postpone for formal
hearing those matters which will require, of necessity, preparation of written documents,
affidavits, memoranda or the calling of witnesses; (10) provide a check list, suggesting to
defense counsel the various procedures and tools available to them. Id. at 393, n. 60, citing
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cally should flow from the concept of omnibus as a single hearing in which
all pretrial issues are either raised or waived by the defendant and in which
the possibility of a guilty plea is explored after the defendant is fully
informed of the case against him through complete discovery. Some of
these benefits have been realized in some of the jurisdictions in which
omnibus has been tested.' However, not all of the expected benefits, particularly those related to efficiency, have been realized; in at least one experiment, the procedure decreased the efficiency of the system.7 The effect of
omnibus on a court's ability to expedite cases is an extremely important
consideration in determining its applicability to busy state courts. If that
effect is detrimental, the procedure may be doomed, for even the most
enthusiastic proponents of omnibus agree that its success depends upon
strong support from the bench and the bar.
It is one thing to argue that the omnibus hearing is a valuable tool to
enforce broadened discovery, which has the side effect of shortening timelapse intervals and reducing judge-time per case; it is quite another to
assert that this discovery enforcement value is beneficial despite the hearings being time-consuming and delay-creating. The detrimental impact of
the omnibus hearing on judge time and time lapse might be regarded
simply as costs of increased fairness or other benefits, but this is precisely
the point: They are costs and, simply stated, the predictability that these
costs will be incurred raises the issue of whether on balance the costs are
justified by the benefits expected in other areas, such as increased fairness
and decisional certainty.'
Federal jurisdictions that have implemented omnibus have reported
varying results. These jurisdictions include the Western District of Texas,
the Western District of Missouri, the District of Kansas and the Middle
District of Florida.' There is evidence that the procedure has improved
both fairness and efficiency in some of these courts. 0 However, the San
Diego project of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California was instituted in 1967 to test the feasibility of the ABA proposal"
Proceedingsat the 1969 Judicial Conference, Tenth Judicial Circuit of the United States, 49
F.R.D. 347, 463 (1969).
6. Myers, Benefits, supra note 5, at 397-99. See Clark, The Omnibus Hearingin State and
FederalCourts, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 766-68 (1974); Oliver, Omnibus PretrialProceedings:
A Review of the Experience of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri, 58 F.R.D. 270 (1972).
7. NIMMER, EXPERIMENT 102. See also Nimmer, A Slightly Movable Object: A Case Study
in Judicial Reform in the Criminal Justice Process-The Omnibus Hearing, 48 DENVER L.J.
179 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Nimmer, Case Study].
8. NIMMER, EXPERIMENT at 54.
9. Weninger, Criminal Discovery and Omnibus Procedure in a Federal Court: A Defense
View, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 514, 521-22 (1976).
10. See Myers, Benefits 402-05; see also R. NIMMER, THE OMNIBUS HEARING FINAL REPORT,
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION REPORT (Tent. draft 1973) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER, FINAL
REPORT].

11.

NIMMER, EXPERIMENT

26.
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and was deemed a failure by the American Bar Foundation reporter.12
The situation of the Southern District of California appears to be more
similar to that of a state trial court than are the other federal jurisdictions
about which reports are available. Of primary importance is the fact that
the Southern District of California has the largest criminal caseload of all
U.S. District Courts. In 1974, 2,470 criminal cases were filed in the district-an average of 502 cases per judge.' 3 The national average was 99
criminal cases per district court judge in 1974,11 and the average in the
Northern District of Georgia was 121." 5 In the Superior Court of Fulton
County, a sample state court, 5,115 criminal matters were filed in 1974,
and each judge was assigned 494-497 cases; 16 in 1975, 4,871 cases were
assigned to judges with each receiving from 442-444 cases.' 7 Besides the
Southern District of California, the only federal court with a caseload
comparable to the Superior Court is the Western District of Texas, which
in 1974 averaged 250 criminal filings per judgeship."
Second, the Southern District of California had a high rate of guilty
pleas before omnibus was instituted.' In contrast, in the Western District
of Texas there had been minimal plea negotiation and only 5% of all guilty
pleas were pleas to reduced charges; 0 in the Middle District of Florida
prior to omnibus, approximately 45 percent of cases were disposed of by
guilty pleas.2 While the high rate of guilty pleas in the Southern District
of California was unaffected by omnibus, both the Texas and Florida districts experienced a significant rise in the percentage of cases disposed of
by guilty pleas. 2
Thus, the Southern District of California is the only district which has
implemented omnibus which combines two significant features of the Superior Court of Fulton County: a large criminal caseload per judge and a
high percentage of disposal by guilty pleas. The second factor is significant
12. Id. at 102: "The San Diego procedure failed to achieve most of its objectives, and it
was counterproductive."
13. Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Management Statistics for
United States Courts 99 (1974).
14. Id. at 120.
15. Id. at 50.
16. 1974 Fulton County Superior Court Activity Summary 4 (copy on file with the Mercer
Law Review). An additional judgeship was created during 1974, to which 160 cases were
assigned.
17. 1975 Fulton County Superior Court Activity Summary 5 (copy on file with the Mercer
Law Review).
18. Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Management Statistics for
United States Courts 61 (1974).
19. NIMMER, EXPERIMENT 11; Nimmer, Case Study 193, 196-97.
20. Myers, Benefits 402; citing NIMMER, FINAL REPORT 64.
21. Clark, supra note 6, at 766.
22. Middle District of Florida: "eighty to eighty-five percent of the cases are disposed of
through guilty pleas." Id. Western District of Texas: "a 30 percent increase in guilty plea
rates." Myers, Benefits 404.
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because, without regard to the desirability of such a system in philosophical or sociological terms, the plea-bargaining system improves efficiency
in overburdened courts. Obviously, early and frequent guilty pleas require
much less court time than do trials. Therefore, a court with a high percentage of disposals by plea is operating efficiently, as was the Southern
23
District of California before omnibus was instituted.
Largely because of its overwhelming caseload and the efficiency developed in response to it, the San Diego division of the Southern District was
not streamlined by the omnibus procedure. Omnibus simply added an
additional court appearance which required 10-25 minutes per case. For
defendants who formerly would have pled guilty anyway, perhaps as early
as arraignment, the additional time involved in the hearing was not counterbalanced by such benefits as fewer continuances or fewer other appearances, since no such appearances had been necessary before. In other cases
as well, increases in the judges' time in court were not offset by an increase
24
in guilty pleas or a decrease in continuances.
In addition to increasing judges' time per case, omnibus also increased
elapsed time to disposition. Not only was there no apparent reduction in
time for cases that would have gone to trial anyway, but dispositions were
more often delayed by defendants until after omnibus.2 5 Consequently, the
frequency of early pleas decreased and omnibus failed to induce firm
26
scheduling and minimize wasted judge time.
The hearing failed to identify, clarify and dispose of issues in the cases.
This fundamental failure has been blamed on the court's inability to devote enough time to each hearing and on its holding the hearing before the
lawyers were fully prepared to make binding commitments in negotiating
7
2

dispositions.

The enforcement of the rules leading to increased discovery, which had
been a major objective of omnibus and which was the only area in which
positive effects were produced, was accomplished at costs to the court that
were far from commensurate with the results obtained:
In many cases the hearing was not necessary for even this purpose
[discovery], and the need for court orders to obtain disclosure did not
arise. Also, even though discovery did increase, some items were not disclosed, and difficult disclosure issues . . . were postponed for a separate
23. "[n response to the chronic lack of resources under which the system functions, the
present negotiated system strongly favors speedy and efficient disposition. Most cases are
disposed of without trials or lengthy legal hearings and within small intervals from filing.
Indictment, arraignment, disposition is the common progression. Any effort to attain greater
efficiency or speed must, therefore, acknowledge that such dispositions are already often
achieved." NIMMER, EXPERIMENT 8.
24. Id. at 11-12.
25. Id. at 12.
26. Id. at 13.
27. Id. at 14.
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hearing. Finally, the increased discovery did not substantially affect the
patterns of disposition as had been expected . . .guilty pleas were no

more frequent in the omnibus hearing year.2"

By 1970, the omnibus hearing had been molded by the system into a
procedure very different from that envisioned by the ABA Standards, and
many of the original objectives had been tacitly abandoned. 9 Federal magistrates presided over hearings averaging less than five minutes long in
which all issues were stipulated on checklist forms submitted beforehand
and in which the magistrate's function was primarily the clerical one of
inquiring about and scheduling whatever further appearances were necessary. The hearing did not advance significantly even its retained objectives. Neither scheduling nor the listing of issues were effective. Discovery
had become so routine that omnibus was unnecessary to enforce it except
in rare cases. Unusual problems were handled by the court outside the
omnibus procedure. '0
Rather than viewing the extensive modification of omnibus between
1967 and 1970 as a degeneration or a perversion of the original model, the
American Bar Foundation report considered it "a rational modification of
a time-consuming, generally ineffective addition to the work of an already
'31
overworked court."
In his comprehensive study of the San Diego project for the American
Bar Foundation, Raymond Nimmer found support for his thesis that, in
the discretionary system that exists in all American criminal jurisdictions,
procedural reforms like omnibus often fail to produce any real change in
practice, because the reform is simply molded by the system until it fits
within the comfortable pattern of the balancing of interests which has
developed over a long period of accommodation of those various interests.2
The manner in which the San Diego system absorbed and modified omnibus so that no real changes occurred exemplifies this theory.
Significant change in any system produces initial costs, as was illustrated in the Western District of Texas; after the introduction of omnibus,
court time and delays increased at first and then decreased as participants
became familiar with the program.n After placing the informal conference
between indictment and arraignment-a major modification that eliminated the necessity for a formal omnibus hearing in most cases-there was
a 30% increase in guilty plea rates and a decrease in written motions and
briefs. 3 Thus the Texas experience indicated that after an initial adjust28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 75-86.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 5-9.
Myers, Benefits 403;
Myers, Benefits 404;

NIMMER, FINAL REPORT
NIMMER, FINAL REPORT

80, 83.
118, 124-25.
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ment period, omnibus can promote efficiency in a system with low guiltyplea rates and extensive motion practice, but only if the process becomes
"transformed . . . from one involving considerable in-court monitoring, to
a system of cooperative informal conferences between counsel."35
When omnibus is applied to a system that already is operating efficiently, the costs persist after the introductory stage. In the San Diego
experiment, increases in judges' time and time before disposition were
extremely costly effects in a system which could not afford any additional
burdens. Nimmer concluded that to introduce omnibus into such a system
and expect greater efficiency to result was unrealistic. "Since the systems
may have long adopted a technique of minimizing in-court time," he said,
"it is entirely inconsistent to seek substantial reform by creating a timeconsuming and generally mandatory in-court appearance. ' ' "
The problem of increased use of judges' time has been dealt with primarily by using federal magistrates to conduct the ommibus hearing. U.S.
commissioners or magistrates commonly have conducted the hearings in
37
the Western District of Missouri and in the Middle District of Florida.
The San Diego experiment in 1970 changed that court's procedure to a
brief hearing before a magistrate. 38 The Western District of Texas does not
use magistrates to conduct omnibus hearings, but its procedure is such
that formal omnibus hearings almost never take place.3 9 The use of magistrates and the smaller caseloads of the district courts have a great effect
on the success of the procedure, as does a low guilty-plea rate, the rise of
which under omnibus will greatly increase efficiency. 0
The superior courts of Georgia have no magistrates to whom the omnibus
hearing could be delegated. The 11 judges of the Superior Court of Fulton
County have too many criminal cases to be able to try them all under any
circumstances; if only one day were allotted to hear each case in its entirety, a judge could try criminal cases only all 365 days in the year and
still not be able to clear his criminal calendar. In 1975, each judge of that
court had from 442-444 criminal cases assigned to him. Of the non-capital
matters, 75% were disposed of by guilty pleas and 12% were deaddocketed; there were trials in only 6% of the cases. 4 In capital cases, which
represent approximately 8% of the total number terminated, 54% were
terminated by guilty pleas, 13% were dead-docketed, and trials were held
in 26% of the cases.42 Statistics for both 1974 and 1975 indicate that the
35. Myers, Benefits 404.
36. Nimmer, Case Study 210.
37. See Clark, supra note 6, 766-68.
38. Nimmer, Case Study 203.
39. Standardsfor Criminal Justice, 57 F.R.D. 229, 324 (1972), remarks of Judge Adrian
A. Spears.
40. Myers, Benefits 405; see also NIMMER, FINAL REPORT 99.
41. 1975 Fulton County Superior Court Activity Summary, supra note 17, at 6.
42. Id. at 5.
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number of criminal cases terminated is approximately equal to the number
filed; in 1975 a few more cases were terminated than were filed.43 These
figures indicate that, despite the heavy criminal caseload per judge, the
overall caseload is being maintained at an input-output ratio of one case
filed to one case terminated. That suggests that the current system is
operating at optimal efficiency.
Promoters of omnibus generally stress the need for broadened discovery
to increase fairness in criminal cases; however, the fact that a substantive
reform is desirable does not mean that it should be implemented by a
procedural reform that will increase court time in state courts, which are
already overburdened. In at least one court of the Fulton County Superior
Court, criminal matters account for well over half the court's time, even
under an efficient system that has a high rate of early guilty pleas and that
allows a defendant to go to trial well within a month of his arraignment if
he desires." To add an additional court appearance to this schedule might
be so burdensome that any gains in fairness will be offset. If the hearing is
offered to all defendants on a voluntary basis, experience has shown, most
of them will request it even if they plan to plead guilty, since neither
defendants nor their attorneys may be expected to pass up a chance to see
the evidence against them.45
Even if omnibus did not cause delay and inefficiency, it is not at all clear
that discovery could be broadened significantly by the omnibus procedure.
Much criminal discovery takes place informally-as might be expected,
since Georgia law clearly provides only a bare minimum of formal discovery to defendants as a matter of right." The argument that informal discovery is granted to selected defense attorneys by prosecutors is less compelling now that indigent defendants are represented primarily by public
defenders who are well known to the prosecutors. Furthermore, prosecutorial discretion is manifested at many steps in the process besides discovery and is a separate issue. Even where the primary benefit of omnibus has
been said to be discovery, as in the Southern District of California, the
defense bar has expressed dissatisfaction with the amount and type of
information disclosed and with the arbitrariness that they perceived prosecutors to be exercising in deciding which attorneys would receive certain
43. Id. at 6; 1974 Fulton County Superior Court Activity Summary 4.
44. The Court Reporter's Quarterly Activity Report for the Months of April, May and
June, 1976, compiled by D. Schulze, Official Court Reporter for Judge Fryer's court, Superior
Court of Fulton County (copy on file with the Mercer Law Review), shows 22 days of criminal
trials out of 50 days in court during the quarter. That figure does not include arraignments,
which require at least an entire morning every week.
45. NIMMER, EXPERIMENT 11-12.
46. See, e.g., Coachman v. State, 236 Ga. 473, 224 S.E.2d 36 (1976); Rini v. State, 235
Ga. 60, 218 S.E.2d 811 (1975); Nations v. State, 234 Ga. 709, 217 S.E.2d 287 (1975); Maddox
v. State, 136 Ga. App. 370, 221 S.E.2d 231 (1975); Jones v. State, 135 Ga. App. 893, 219 S.E.2d
585 (1975). See also Daniel, Criminal Discovery: A Matter of Fundamental Fairness, 12 GA.
ST. B. J. 134 (1976).
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kinds of information. 7 Omnibus has not alleviated such arbitrariness; indeed, even proponents of broad discovery agree that some discretion must
remain for prosecutors to be able to refuse discovery to defendants whom
they feel might intimidate witnesses or suborn perjury." A recent study of
defense views about discovery and the omnibus proceeding in the Southern
District of California found that, although they unanimously agreed that
discovery is helpful in representing criminal defendants, "76 percent felt
that the omnibus hearing was of little or no help in their cases."' 9 The
conclusions of that study are quite relevant to the application of omnibus
to a state jurisdiction:
The lack of success with this procedure in the Southern District of California, however, demonstrates that their objectives cannot be realized without the support of all those concerned with the administration of the
criminal law-judge, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and even government
investigators. This is especially true in a federal court, where wide disparity exists between the limited discovery available through the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the broad discovery called for by the
omnibus procedure. Therefore, to achieve the purposes of the omnibus
procedure the parties must be willing to make disclosures not required by
law; where necessary, courts, in the exercise of their discretionary powers,
must compel such disclosures."
The "wide disparity" between discovery required by law and that foreseen
by omnibus is even wider in Georgia.51
Although the proponents of omnibus are most enthusiastic about the
broadened discovery that they say it promotes, 52 it has been suggested that
where such discovery exists, omnibus is superfluous.53 Where discovery is
not broad enough, the California study indicates that omnibus cannot be
successful in compelling it unless there is a concerted effort by the entire
system. Such a massive effort, which could not be accomplished without
great costs to the court's efficiency, would require a commitment to the
principle of broadened discovery that presently does not exist in Georgia.
There are several differences between state and federal criminal practice
47. Weninger, supra note 9, at 532-35.
48. See generally Discovery in Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 481 (1966); see also Brennan,
Remarks on Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 56, 62 (1963).
49. Weninger, supra note 9, at 539.
50. Id. at 560-61.
51. See note 46, supra, and accompanying text.
52. Oliver, supra note 6, at 284; Comment, The Omnibus Hearing:A Proposalfor California Criminal Pretrial Motion Procedure, 4 PAc. L. J. 861 (1973); Myers, Benefits 393.
53. Nimmer, Case Study 188-92. Discovery was voluntary in San Diego in most cases, so
no court intervention was necessary; broadened disclosure left the dispositional pattern unchanged. Id. at 189, 191. See also Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note 39, at 324, in
which Judge Spears remarks that discovery is a "free and open situation where very very
seldom do we have . . .an omnibus hearing" and that he has not had an omnibus hearing
in more than a year.
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that are relevant to any discussion of procedural reform. The criminal
caseload of a state trial court is likely to be larger than that of a federal
district court in the same area; a comparison of the Fulton County Superior Court criminal statistics for 1974 with those of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia shows that, although both serve the
same urban area, the state court handled 71/2 times the number of criminal cases as the federal district court." The Southern District of California
is the only federal court with a caseload equivalent to the Fulton County
Superior Court, and many of those are immigration cases that are handled
primarily as an administrative problem by the senior judge in his office.55
Furthermore, the types of cases differ. The federal court tries a growing
number of white-collar crime cases, such as mail fraud, embezzlement,
income-tax fraud and securities fraud." Such cases require a great deal of
documentary and real evidence, and expert witnesses such as handwriting
analysts are often called; discovery in such cases helps the prosecution,
and that is one incentive for federal prosecutors to engage in voluntary
reciprocal discovery. 7 These cases are similar to civil cases and can be
handled more efficiently under an omnibus pretrial proceeding because of
their complexity and the likelihood of debates over documents as evidence.
These cases are not common in the state trial courts. Finally, criminal
discovery under the federal rules is broader than under Georgia law.
Perhaps proponents of omnibus cite broadened discovery as its primary
objective because the original expectation of efficiency has not materialized. 51 Much of the reportage on omnibus consists of anecdotal evidence
from participants; the only comprehensive studies of whether omnibus has
accomplished its objectives are less enthusiastic about the success of discovery.59 Indications are that omnibus will not succeed in forcing disclosure
broader than that required by law without vigilant court supervision;
therefore, it is not surprising that defense attorneys in San Diego were
dissatisfied with the discovery received pursuant to omnibus in 1974.'0
Lacking magistrates but having a caseload comparable to the Southern
District of California, the Fulton County Superior Court could not afford
the additional court time that omnibus would require. Even if discovery
could be broadened and fairness promoted, the resulting inefficiency would
54. In the Northern District of Georgia, 681 criminal cases were filed in 1974. Management
Statistics for U.S. Courts, supra note 13, at 50. In the Fulton County Superior Court, 5,115
cases were filed in 1974. 1974 Fulton County Superior Court Activity Summary, supra note
16, at 4.
55. NIMMER, EXPERIMENT 25.
56. See 1974 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
(1975), Table D-3, for a list of all criminal cases filed in U.S. District Courts in 1974 by nature
of offense and district.
57. Standards for CriminalJustice, supra note 39, at 325-26.
58. See authorities cited in note 52, supra.
59. Weninger, supra note 9, at 558; NIMMER, EXPERIMENT 66-71, 85-86.
60. Weninger, supra note 9, at 538-39.
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hamstring the court, and eventually the system would have to react by
accommodating the procedure in some fashion. It is quite possible that
such an accommodation would lead to the accomplishment of none of the
goals of omnibus, including discovery, as was the case in San Diego. As
Judge Adrian Spear of the Western District of Texas, one of the most
enthusiastic proponents of omnibus, has stated, "we should do everything
we can do to see that justice is administered fairly, but expeditiously, and
at the least expense to the taxpayers.""1 The available evidence indicates
that the introduction of the omnibus hearing into state courts such as the
Fulton County Superior Court would not accomplish the goal of fair and
expeditious rendering of justice.
The goal of a procedure that will administer the law more fairly is always
to be sought, and perhaps some forms of omnibus may have promoted this
goal in other courts; yet neither defendants' interests nor those of society
are served by reforms that cause counterproductive delay in the administration of justice. Before omnibus or any modification of it is seriously
considered for the state courts of Georgia, the existing discretionary system
should be carefully studied, as Nimmer advises, especially since there is
such a dearth of information on the operation and efficiency of the Georgia
courts. Finally, before the interests of expeditious justice are sacrificed to
what may be an impracticable idealization of fairness, the following considerations should be carefully heeded:
For when we aim at perfect procedure, we impair the capacity of the legal
order to achieve the basic values for which it was created, that is, to settle
disputes promptly and peaceably, to restrain the strong, to protect the
weak, and to conform the conduct of all to settled rules of law. If criminal
procedure is unable promptly to convict the guilty and promptly to acquit
the innocent of the specific accusation against them, and to do it in a
manner that retains public confidence in the accuracy of its results, the
deterrent effect of swift and certain punishment is lost, the feeling of just
retribution disappears, and belief in the efficacy of the system of justice
declines.
61.
62.
LEGAL

2

Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note 39, at 333.
M. FLEMING, THE PRICE OF PERFECT JUSTICE: THE ADVERSE
DOCTRINE ON THE AMERICAN COURTROOM 6 (1974).
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